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USING THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 
TO REMEDY PROPERTY DAMAGE 
FOLLOWING CUSTOMS SERVICE SEIZURES 
The United States Customs Service may seize property as a 
means of enforcing customs laws.• In 1982, for example, the 
Customs Service confiscated property valued at over $237 million. 2 
Customs officials place this property in storage, 3 where it may 
remain for a lengthy period of time4 pending administrative5 and 
1. The U.S. Customs Service embodies only part of the federal government's seizure powers. 
Although the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
also seize considerable amounts of property, the Customs Service seizes more property than any 
other federal agency. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, BEnER CARE AND DISPOSAL OF SEIZED CARS, 
BOATS, AND PLANES SHOULD SAVE MONEY AND BENEFIT LAW ENFORCEMENT (July 15, 1983) 
[hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. Although this Note focuses on the U.S. Customs Service, 
the analysis applies equally to seizures by other government agencies. 
The customs laws allow for the seizure of many different kinds of property under a variety 
of circumstances. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1594 (1976) (allowing seizure to force payment of as;es-
sed penalties); 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(a) (1976) (allowing seizure for facilitating the introduction of 
articles into the United States contrary to law); 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(l), (4) (1976) (allowing seizure 
of controlled substances and conveyances used in their transport). 
2. In 1982, the Customs Service seized vehicles valued at over $35 million, aircraft valued 
at over $34 million, vessels worth over $44 million, monetary instruments worth over $32 million, 
and miscellaneous general merchandise valued at over $92 million. U.S. CUsroMS SERVICE, CUsroMS 
U.S.A. 36 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CUSTOMS USA]. Although narcotics seizures totaled nearly 
$7 billion, id. at 37, recovery for property damage is rarely an issue, because owners seldom 
attempt to recover these items. 
3. 19 u.s.c. § 1605 (1976). 
4. The average period of detention was 9 months for vehicles, 17 months· for aircraft, and 
20 months for vessels. GAO REPORT, supra note I, at 13. 
S. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976). The Secretary of the Treasury has authority to forego property 
forfeiture, as long as the owner was not guilty of willful negligence or intentional violation of 
customs laws. 
The Customs Service has many procedures it follows after a property seizure. The Customs 
Service first decides whether it has probable cause to seize the property. Most cases have held 
that, under their factual circumstances, the owner has no right to a preseizure hearing or to 
advance notice of the pending seizure. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 
;416 U.S. 663 (1974) (involving Puerto Rican seizure procedure); United States v. One (1) 1972 
Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, FL 8443AY, 501 F.2d 1327, 1329 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) 
(involving forfeiture proceedings under Customs Service regulations). The Customs Service next 
appraises the value of the property. 19 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976). Written notice of the applicable 
penalties involved and the pending forfeiture are sent to all interested parties. 19 C.F.R. § 162.31 
(1983). The Customs Service then stores the property in the most convenient and appropriate 
place with due regard to the expense involved. 19 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976). The Customs Service 
can assess civil penalties against the property owner. 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (1976). Claimants can 
file a motion for mitigation of the penalties and forfeiture, under which the Secretary of the 
83 
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juclicial6 decisions regarding the proper disposition of the proper-
ty. Seized property may be damaged during this detention period. 7 
Negligent government handling and misplacement, vandalism, theft, 
and damage from inadequate storage facilities may all contribute 
to a decline in the value of the property. 8 Recent increases in 
the use of seizures as a tool for customs law enforcement have 
aggravated this problem and will probably cause further problems 
in the future. 9 
If the government returns seized property to the owner in dam-
aged condition, the owner may suffer a significant loss. Still the 
majority of courts hold that an owner cannot remedy the· damage 
done to his property, 10 because section 2680(c) of the Federal 
Treasury and sometimes a district officer have power to cancel the forfeiture upon payment 
of penalties. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1614, 1618 (1976). 
6. For property not exceeding $10,000 in value, the court will declare summary forfeiture if 
no claim has been received within 20 days after general notice in a local newspaper for three 
consecutive weeks. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1609 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.45, 162.47 
(1983). When such a claim is filed, the claimant must pay a $250 bond to cover court costs 
in case the government prevails. 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976), 19 C.F.R. § 162.47 (1983). Whatever 
the value of the property, the next step is a judicial condemnation procedure, id., in which 
claimants will have the burden of proof upon a showing by the Customs Service that it had 
probable cause to seize the property. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1976). If the property owner fails to 
file a claim in time, 19 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976), or if the judicial forfeiture proceeding holds against 
the owner, the government may dispose of the property as it wishes. If the owner prevails, the 
government must return the property. 
7.. For example, the average loss in value of seized conveyances during the period of govern-
ment detention is $800 per vehicle, $37,900 per vessel, and $42,700 per aircraft. A portion of 
these losses derives from damage to the property. GAO REPORT, supra note I, at 13. 
8. Much of the loss in value is due to the long periods of storage (e.g., 9 months for vehicles, 
17 months for aircraft, 20 months for vessels) brought about by delays in the iudicial forfeiture 
process and an occasional inability to resell quickly the large number of items seized. As a result 
of these long periods of detention, depreciation often proves an additional factor in the total 
loss in value of property such as conveyances. Id. Inadequate maintenance and storage also con-
tribute to such losses. Id. at 20. 
9. Id. at 6-8. 
10. Kosak v. United States, 679 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that FTCA § 2680(c) bars 
a claim asserting Customs Service negligence in damaging art objects during their detention), 
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983) (No. 82-618); United States v. One (1) Douglas A-26B Air-
craft, 662 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that§ 2680(c) bars claim asserting negJJgent damage 
attributable to the Customs Service during the detention of an airplane); United States v. One 
(1) 197.2 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, FL 8443AY, SOI F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974) (barring a 
boat owner's counterclaim for physical damages allegedly inflicted during the period of the boat's 
detention); Walker v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 251 (D. Ga. 1977) (holding that § 2680(c) 
barred a claim against the federal government for physical damages a plane suffered during deten-
tion); S. Schonfeld Co. v. S.S. Akra Tenaron, 363 F. Supp. 1220 (D.S.C. 1973) (barring a remedy 
to a claim alleging Food and Drug Administration negligence in damaging a ship's cargo during 
detention); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 579 F.2d 617 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (holding that 
§ 2680(c) provided persuasive authority to bar a claim for failure to return the full lot of goods 
seized), vacated per curiam, 444 U.S. 460 (1980). But see A & D Int'!, Inc. v. United States, 
665 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1982) (allowing recovery for gemstones lost after they had been left with 
a Customs official for appraisement); A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service Dep't of 
Treasury, 593 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that § 2680(c) precludes only those claims resulting 
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Tort Claims Act 11 (FTCA) immunizes the federal government from 
"any claim arising in respect of . . . the detention of goods." 12 
The majority interpretation, however, conflicts with the policy con-
siderations underlying the FTCA. Therefore, this Note argues that 
courts should interpret the FTCA to allow claimants to recover 
for detention-related property damage. 
Part I of this Note explains the general application of the FfCA 
to tort claims asserted against the federal government. Part II 
demonstrates the inadequacy of current judicial arguments regard-
ing the adjudication of detention-related property damage claims 
under section 2680(c). Part III presents the. policy considerations 
behind the FTCA and concludes that those considerations allow 
courts to interpret the Act to cover detention-related property 
damage claims. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FTCA 
The FTCA, enacted in 1946, generally allows claimants to sue the 
federal government for the torts of its employees. 13 This judicial remedy 
replaced the unsatisfactory procedure whereby tort claimants had to 
pursue their remedy against the governm~nt by presenting a private 
bill in Congress pleading for special relief. 14 The Act generally pur-
ports to render the federal government "liable ... in the .same man- ' 
ner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances," 15 even though important procedural differences still 
exist between a suit against the government and a suit against an 
individual. 16 The government has been held liable under the FfCA for 
from the detention itself, and not those claims resulting from negligent handling of the property 
in the course of detention); Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958) 
(allowing recovery for property lost by a Customs official after it had been removed to a warehouse 
for inspection). 
11. 28 u.s.c. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 1504, 2401-2402, 2411-2412, 2671-2672, 2674-2680 (1976 
& Supp. V 1981). See infra notes 15-24 and accompanying text for a description of how the 
Act affects tort claims asserted against the federal government and its agencies. 
12. The full text of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) states that "[Government tort immunity shall be 
retained for] [a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs 
duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any 
other law-enforcement officer." 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) provides that district courts have jurisdiction to hear money 
damage claims based on negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of government employees acting 
within the scope of their employment. 
14. Private bills are those introduced in the Congress usually pleading for relief of a single 
individual's grievance. Private bills must survive the same procedure and avoid the same obstacles 
as general Congressional bills. For more detailed discussion on the private bill procedure, see 
Gellhom & Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims Against the United States, 55 CoLUM. 
L. R:Ev. 1 (1955); Note, Private Bills in Congress, 19 H.uv. L. R:Ev. 1684 (1966). 
15. 28 u.s.c. § 2674 (1976). 
16. The claimant cannot bring an FTCA suit to the courts until the claimant has filed a 
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common torts, such as for damage arising from automobile accidents. 11 
In addition, the Supreme Court has indicated that the government could 
be liable for more unusual torts, such as negligence in fighting a forest 
fire 18 or causing a shipwreck by failing to maintain a government-run 
lighthouse. 19 
In addition, an FTCA suit is a much more limited cause of action 
than a suit against a private individual, because Congress has not con-
sented to tort liability for certain government activities. Section 2680 
of the Act lists thirteen exceptions to the general rule that tort claims 
can be brought against government officials. 20 If any one of these ex-
ceptions applies, the government retains tort immunity and the claimants 
may only pursue a governmental remedy through legislative private 
bill relief. 21 
claim with the tortfeasing government agency and that agency has denied the claim. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2675 ( 1976). In addition, FfCA suits do not allow for prejudgment interest or punitive damages. 
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). Finally, special statutes of limitations apply to FfCA suits: recovery 
in the courts is barred unless the claimant files the administrative claim within two years after 
the cause of action accrues and files the judicial complaint within six years -after the claim arises. 
28 u.s.c. § 2401 (1976). 
· . 17. Oaims involving government vehicle accidents comprise most of the actions brought under 
the FfCA. 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 219.02 (1983). 
18. See, e.g., Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957). 
19. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). 
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). These exceptions bar a judicial recovery for claims based on 
government performance of a discretionary function or exercise of due care in the execution 
of a statute, negligent handling of the U.S. mail, collection of revenue and the detention of 
property by law enforcement officials, admiralty claims, operation of the Trading with the Enemy 
Act, imposition of a federal quarantine, certain specific intentional torts committed by govern-
ment employees, operation of the Treasury Department, combatant activities of the armed forces, 
a cause of action arising in a foreign country, activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority, ac-
tivities of the Panama Canal Company, and activities of federal land banks. 
21. See Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 544 n.67 (1947); see 
also supra note 14. The ineffectiveness of legislative private bills motivated the creation of the 
FfCA as the primary remedy for federal government torts. 
Private bill tort claim adjudication proved unsatisfactory to Congress because of the burden 
entailed in investigating and disposing of these claims. The government's increased use of vehicles 
and the general growth of government exposed it to an ever-expanding range and quantity of 
tort claims by the mid-twentieth century. See generally I L. JAYSON, supra note 17, §§ 52, 58. 
Private bill tort claim adjudication also proved unsatisfactory to tort claimants. See id. § 58. 
The burden imposed upon Congress in adjudicating these tort claims precluded an adequate 
weighing of the merits of each issue. 67 CONG. REc. 4756 (1926) (statement of Senator Means). 
Case-by-case deliberation, combined with a changing Congressional membership, resulted in a 
lack of consistency and uniformity. H.R. REP. No. 667, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1926). Moreover, 
Congress lacked the fact-finding ability necessary for proper claim adjudication. Id. at 14 (Sup-
plementary Report of Rep. Cellar}. In addition, claimants had a remedy in Congress as a matter 
of grace, not as a matter of right, and claims were subject to the whims of Congress, or even 
of a single Congressman. Id. at 13-14 (Supplementary Report of Rep. Cellar). Finally, Con-
gressmen making the decisions were subject to political pi-essures and dealing. See, e.g., Organization 
of Congress: Hearings on H.R. Con. Res. 18 Before the Joint Comm. on the Organization of 
Congress, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1946) (testimony of Rep. Kefauver) (describing a $5,000 
claim compromised to $500 because of the impending adjournment of Congress, and also stating 
that strong ties with political figures tended to give certain claimants more satisfactory results); 
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Concerning the _condition of goods following seizure, section 2680(c)22 
provides the most important of these specific exceptions. That provi-
sion bars claims arising out of the detention of ·goods and collection 
of taxes. The exceptions contained in section 2680 immunize the govern-
ment from prosecution even for the negligent performance of nondiscre-
tionary acts. 23 Therefore, under the exception for property detention 
found in section 2680(c), the government would be immune from liability 
for even flagrant negligence in nondiscretionary acts, such as negligent 
handling of seized property. 24 
II. PRESENT TREATMENT OF CLAIMS ArusING 
OUT OF THE DETENTION OF Gooos 
A majority of co·urts have held that section 2680(c) bars both prop-
erty damage and conversion claims, while a minority have limited the 
bar to conversion claims, allowing a remedy for simple property loss 
or damage.25 Persons bringing conversion claims allege that the govern-
ment wrongfully detained property and ref used to return it to the 
owner. 26 Plaintiffs with property damage claims allege that the govern-
ment returned the seized property in damaged condition or lost it. 27 
Conversion claims are distinguishable from property damage claims 
chiefly on the ground that the conversion includes a challenge that the 
government wrongfully seized the property, 28 while in property damage 
claims that determination has already been decided. 29 In many prop-
General Tort Bill: Hearlng Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Claims, 72d Cong., 
1st Sess. 6 (1932) (testimony of Rep. Collins). 
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976). 
23. See Comment, supra note 21, at 545-46 ("These provisions extend beyond the first ex-
ception [§ 2680(a)] because, having no qualifying phrases, they cover even gross negligence in 
performing a ministerial duty."). 
24. Acts associated with postseizure property storage have been held to be nondiscretionary. 
Ritter v. Castellini, 173 N.J. Super. 509, 513-14, 414 A.2d 614, 616-17 (1980). 
25. See cases cited supra note 10. 
26. Conversion is defined as "an action done intentionally, that is, for the purpose of deal-
ing with the chattel in such a way that if there be an outstanding inconsistent property interest 
in it, the same will be invaded." 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 210, at 126 
(1956); see also Catania v. Garage De Le Paix, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. av. App. 1976). 
27. For examples of property damage claims, see supra note 10. 
· 28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
29. The government's right to seize is usually adjudicated at the forfeiture proceeding. The 
judicial forfeiture proceeding is one in rem against the property. Theoretically, the sole issue 
is whether that property was used in violation of Customs laws. If the Customs Service cannot 
prove that it had probable cause to confiscate the property, claimants will have the property 
returned to them. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1976). Even if there existed probable cause for the seizure, 
claimants can recover their property if they can show that the property was not actually used 
in violation of customs laws. Id. 
Several Supreme Court cases have also considered whether the harshness of in rem proceedings 
should be mitigated by allowing owners the "innocent owner" defense - that they could not · 
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erty damage cases, the issue of the government's right to seize has , 
become moot. 30 
A. Arguments in Favor of Government Immunity for 
Property Damage Claims 
Most of the decisions holding the government immune from prop-
- erty damage claims have looked no further than the language of sec-
tion 2680(c) in so holding. 31 They have not gone beyond the language 
to advance any further theory as to congressional intentions in enac-
ting the FTCA. For example, in Kosak v. United States, 32 the court 
argued that it must follow the ordinary language of a statute absent 
a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary. 33 The court 
suggested that, because the ordinary language of section 2680(c) "does 
not purport to distinguish among types of harm,'' it presumptively 
bars both property damage claims and conversion claims, and that any 
contrary conclusion would require a clear showing that Congress in-
tended that effect. 34 The court, however, did not look to congressional 
reasonably know their property was being used in violation of the law. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo 
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (suggesting that the innocent owner defense 
might be constitutionally mandated in government forfeiture cases). Most decisions, however, 
acknowledge the harsh results to an innocent owner but hold the defense inapplicable in forfeiture 
cases involving federal statutes. See, e.g., United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 
U.S. 321, 333 (1926); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921). Calero-
Toledo appears to stand for the proposition that if the innocent owner does everything within 
his power to prevent the property's unlawful use, then the defense should be considered valid. 
416 U.S. at 690. 
30. The rightfulness of the government's seizure will be made moot if the Customs Service 
opts to forego the property's forfeiture. 
For administrative relief of forfeitures, Customs Service regulations provide that the property 
will be returned if the owner can convince the Customs Service that the property was not used 
in violaton of law. 19 C.F.R. § 171.31 (1983) (stating that the claim of forfeiture will be can-
celled if the act or omission forming the basis of the claim did not occur). Again, as in judicial 
proceedings, supra note 29, the effectiveness of asserting the "innocent owner" defense is not 
clear. It appears to be at least a factor in Customs Service remittance decisions, because 19 C.F.R. 
§ 171.13 (1983) requires that an owner asserting his innocence present evidence attesting to that 
fact. The succeeding provisions concerned with adjudicating claims, however, do not address 
the consequences of that defeqse. The problem for property owners under Customs Service remit-
tance procedure is that the Service can return the property under the condition that the owner 
agree to accept the property "as is," thereby foregoing all liability for negligently incurred detention-
related property damage. 
31. See, e.g., Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 579 F.2d 617 (Ct. Cl. 1978), vacated 
per curiam, 444 U.S. 460 (1980); United States v. One (1) 1972 Wood, 19 Foot Custom Boat, 
FL 8443AY, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); S. Schonfeld Co. v. S.S. Akra Tenaron, 
363 F. Supp. 1220 (D.S.C. 1973). 
32. 679 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983) (No. 82-618). 
33. See Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GlE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980), 
cited in American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) and Kosak v. United States, 
679 F.2d at 308. 
34. 679 F.2d at 308. 
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intention in order to determine the proper interpretation of section 
2680(c); instead it summarily concluded that no contrary intention 
existed. 35 
B. Arguments in Favor of Remedying Property Damage Claims 
Courts have offered two principal arguments supporting property 
damage remedies. The first compares the wording of section 2680(c) 
with that of section 2680(b). Section 2680(b) bars all claims "arising 
out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of mail by the 
Postal Service. 36 Courts have argued that if Congress had intended for 
section 2680(c) to bar property damage claims, Congress would have 
written that section using the specific language found in the directly 
preceding provision, section 2680(b). 37 Nevertheless, although the de-
tailed language of section 2680(b) more explicitly reveals the congres-
sional intention to bar property damage claims, the more encompass-
ing language of section 2680(c) could express the same congressional 
intention for Customs cases. Thus, this argument raises only a possi-
ble distinction in section 2680(c) between property damage and con-
version claims; it does not show that Congress intended for that distinc-
tion to be decisive. 
The second argument compares the wording of section 2680(c) with 
the other FfCA exceptions. 38 This argument notes that section 2680(c) 
is the only FTCA exception that uses the phrase "arising in respect 
of," while all the others are phrased "arising out of" various govern-
ment activities. This argument then emphasizes that "arising in respect 
of'' is a more restrictive phrase than "arising out of," and that sec-
tion 2680(c) should therefore be narrowly interpreted, allowing remedy 
for property damage claims. 39 Again, this argument raises only the 
possibility of a distinction; it does not establish that Congress intend-
ed for the difference in language to be significant. In fact, the evidence 
indicates that the difference in language was unintentional. 40 
35. Id. 
36. 28 u.s.c. § 2680(b) (1976). 
31. See Kosak v. United States, 679 F.2d 306, 310 (3d Cir. 1982) (Weis, J., dissenting), cert. 
granted, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983) (No. 82-618); A & D Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 665 F.2d 669, 
672 (5th Cir. 1982); A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 593 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 
1978); Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 1958). 
38. See Kosak v. United States, 679 F.2d 306, 310 (3d Cir. 1982) (Weis, J., dissenting), cert. 
granted, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983) (No. 82-618). 
39. Id.; see also Comment, Governmental Liability for Customs Officials' Negligence: Kosak 
v. United States, 67 MINN. L. R.Ev. 1040, 1054 (1983). 
40. Committee reports summarized § 2680(c) as barring all claims arising out of the deten-
tion of property. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946). Other committee 
reports use similar or identical language. ~.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong.;lst Sess. 6 (1945); 
S. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1942); H.R. REP. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 
10 (1942). 
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Scrutiny of the language of section 2680(c) and the surrounding ex-
ceptions has not provided courts with a clear answer to the question 
of whether the FfCA covers negligent storage and maintenance of seized 
goods by customs officials. A more detailed investigation of the federal 
tort process is required. The considerations underlying the coverage 
and exceptions to the FTCA reveal that property damages arising out 
of detention of goods should be cognizable despite section 2680(c). 
III. UNDERLYING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CLAIMS 
ARISING OUT OF THE DETENTION OF GOODS 
Section 2680(c), like the other specific FTCA exceptions, extends 
government immunity beyond the discretionary function protections 
of section 2680(a). 41 The Act's legislative history reveals two policy 
considerations used in formulating these specific exceptions. First, Con-
gress intended to bar claims challenging certain governmental activities 
that should be free from the impending threat of damage suits. 42 This 
justification resembles that used to explain the discretionary function 
_exception in section 2680(a). 43 Second, the availability of adequate alter-
native remedies would bar any tort claim. 44 Despite ambiguity in the 
legislative history. the latter justification seems to underlie section 
2680(c). 45 Neither justification, however, supports interpreting section 
41. Section 2680(a) immunizes the government from tort liability for all harm arising out 
of the exercise of a discretionary functions. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). Judicial interpretation 
of the term "discretionary function" has concerned the distinction between "planning" and "opera-
tional" decisions. "Planning" decisions, those relating to whether, when, and where to act, are 
discretionary. "Operational" decisions, those relating to how to act, are not considered discre-
tionary. See Ogden, Entity Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: An Analysis and a 
Proposal for Changes in the Law, 15 U.C.D. L. REv. 907, 938 (1982); see also Indian Towing, 
Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955) (concluding that the decision whether to operate 
a lighthouse is discretionary, but daily operation of a lighthouse is not); American Exch. Bank 
v. United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1958) (holding that designing a building is discretionary,. 
but failing to provide handrails on outside steps is not); Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 
885 (D. Utah 19S3) (holding that deciding whether to test atomic bomb is discretionary, but 
negligence in the testing procedure is not). 
The FrCA immunizes discretionary decisions from liability because the threat of potential 
liability could hinder objective decision making and interfere with effective government opera-
tion. Comment, supra note 21, at 545. 
42. See supra note 40. 
43. See supra note 41. 
44. See supra note 40. 
45. Most of the committee reports simply present the two policy considerations and state 
that together they justify the presence of the specific FfCA exceptions. They do not detail which 
policy consideration supports which exception. See· supra note 40. 
The existence of two separate exceptions in § 2680(c) increases the confusion. Section 2680(c) 
exempts the government from liability for wrongful tax collection and for property detention. 
One committee memorandum justifies both § 2680(c) exclusions by the adequate alternative remedy , 
theory by stating that alternative remedies existed for recovering wrongful tax payments. Tort 
Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. 
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2680(c) to bar recovery for property damage claims. The existence of 
alternative remedies justifies denial of an FTCA remedy for conver-
sion claims but not claims for property damage. 
A. The "Impending Liability" Rationale 
The "impending liability" rationale immunizes both the discretionary 
and nondiscretionary acts of the government if exposure to threats of 
suit and liability would disrupt effective government operation. 46 As 
reflected in the discretionary function exception of section 2680(a), non-
discretionary government acts generally do not enjoy immunity. 47 By 
using the "impending liability" rationale, Congress acknowledged that 
effective government operation could also be disrupted if nondiscre-
tionary acts could lead to governmental liability. 
Congress used this rationale to justify barring claims challenging 
government acts in the handling of mail48 and in the operation of the 
Treasury Department.49 In the case of mail delivery, the number of 
potential suits and the likelihood of consequential damages justify im-
munity for nondiscretionary acts. ~0 The potential liability could therefore 
far exceed the value of the goods handled. 51 Similarly, regar~ing 
on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 38 (1940) (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff) [hereinafter 
cited as Tort Claims Hearings]. This interpretation implies that the adequate alternative remedy· 
rationale also justified the detention of goods. The Supreme Court has followed this interpreta-
tion. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1980) (per curiam); see also 
2 L. JAYSON, supra note 17, § 256.0l (explaining that Congress was satisfied that "adequate 
remedies are already available" for claims of this kind). 
46. See supra note 41 for the same argument as applied to discretionary acts. 
41. Id. 
48. These claims are barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (1976). In justifying this remedial bar, 
Mr. Holtzoff stated that "[l)t would be intolerable, of course, if in any case of loss or delay 
the Government could be sued for damages." Tort Claims Hearings, supra note 45, at 38 (testimony 
of Alexander Holtzoff). This is a rephrasing of the "impending liability" rationale because it 
implies that governmental mail service would be disrupted by such claims. Mail users also could 
protect themselves by procuring insurance. This fact also justified the exception. See Tort Claims 
Hearings, supra note 45, at 38 (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff). 
49. These claims are barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(i) (1976). The legislative history reveals 
that this exception was part of the FTCA because it seemed "proper and desirable to the framers 
of the bill." Tort Claims Hearings, supra note 45, at 39 (testimony of Alexander Holtzhoff). 
This is another aspect of the "impending liability" rationale. For a similar conclusion, see 2 
L. JAYSON, supra note 17, § 261. 
SO. See Comment, supra note 21, at 545. Since the United States Postal Service handled 
approximately 110 billion pieces of mail in 1981, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, STATISTICAL A.BsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1982-83, at 554 chart 931 (103d ed. 1982), 
the sheer number of suits that could arise from these transactions would be astronomical; see 
also Ogden, supra note 41, at 916-17 & n.57 (listing types of potential consequential damages 
arising out of mail claims). A claim likely to arise often occurs when contractual arrangements 
are made through the mail and one of the letters is lost or delayed, preventing the contract's 
formation. Either party would have a right to sue for lost profits or damages incurred in reliance 
that the contract was operational. 
51. See Ogden, supra note 41, at 916-17 & n.57. Professor Ogden argues that consequential 
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Treasury Department operations, potentially immense liability and 
widespread damages justify the nondiscretionary immunity. 52 Treasury 
Department operations affect nationwide problems such as inflation 
and unemployment, and even simple errors in execution could create 
potentially unlimited damages all across the country. 53 
Neither property damage nor conversion detention claims involve 
such problems for the government. They will arise far less frequently 
than mail handling claims simply because of the difference in the 
numbers of goods involved. 54 Detention claims also will not create the 
potentially staggering levels of liability that Treasury Department claims 
would generate, because nondiscretionary detention acts affect only 
the property's owner, and liability will generally be limited to the value 
of the property being handled. 55 Therefore, the cost of remedying deten-
tion claims will not disrupt effective property detention. 56 Thus, govern-
ment immunity for detention claims can be justified only for claims 
for which adequate alternative remedies exist. 
B. "Adequate Alternative Remedy" Rationale 
Congress justified some of the FTCA exceptions based on the presence 
of "adequate alternative remedies. " 51 Congress did not, however, design 
damages arising out of postal claims would potentially cause the liability to outweigh the value 
of the mailed items. 
52. See Comment, supra note 21, at 545-46; Ogden, supra note 41, at 924-25. 
53. The economic consequences of Treasury Department activities could include "increased 
unemployment that results from government anti-inflation policies, increased inflation caused 
by government policies to stimulate a recessionary economy, and disparate effects on industries 
such as housing, when the government tinkers with interest rates and the money supply. Monetary 
liability for these consequences could be staggering." Ogde·n, supra note 41, at 924. 
54. ln 1981, the U.S. Postal Service handled roughly 110 billion pieces of mail. See supra 
note SO. In contrast, the U.S. Customs Service in the same year made 49,000 seizures of general 
property and 22,000 seizures of narcotics and dangerous drugs. OJsTOMS USA, supra note 2, 
at 36-37. 
55. Detention claims might assert consequential damages in addition to the value of the seized 
property, presumably for damages generated by being denied the use of the property during 
the period of its detention. These additional damages should be small because they can be mitigated 
by securing a replacement for the seized property during its detention. 
56. The biggest problem for the Customs Service in their detention of seized property has 
been the enormous backlog of property in their storage facilities. Due to the large number of 
recent seizures, see GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-8, and the long period of time in which 
the property must be detained, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, government agencies 
have occasionally been forced to halt seizures because they had no place to store additional prop-
erty. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 47-54. Under these circumstances, placing government liability 
on discretionary detention acts might cause additional interference with effective government 
operation. This effect would only be a slight one, however, as the major interference comes 
from the backlog in seized property, not from liability for property damage caused during deten-
tion. The General Accounting Office has made several suggestions to Congress that would allow 
Customs to clear out their storage areas and expedite the forfeiture process. Id. at 55-61. 
57. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
FALL 1983) Customs Seizures 93 
the Act to deny claimants a remedy for every claim cognizable under 
a separate statute. 58 Rather, Congress wished to retain particular ex-
isting procedures for handling some of these claims. For example, Con-
gress justified the denial of an FTCA remedy for claims arising out 
of the collection of taxes59 on the basis that "[t]here are various tax 
laws providing the machinery for recovering back any tax that has been 
paid but was not properly owing. There was no purpose in interfering 
with that machinery." 60 The question remains as to which procedures 
Congress considered sufficiently important to warrant this denial. 
1. Conversion claims- Conversion claims, in essence, present 
wrongful seizure claims61 and thus constitute little more than a claim 
demanding the return of the property to its owner. 62 At the judicial 
forfeiture hearing during the seizure process, the owner can raise the 
issues of the wrongfulness of the seizure and the right to recover the 
property.63 A suit against the United States under the FTCA should 
not address these issues, because the forfeiture process already con-
tains procedures for adjudicating these claims. 
The legislative history indicates that Congress not only intended to 
bar FTCA detention-related conversion claims in this manner, but also 
that these were the only claims Congress intended to so bar. Congress 
justified section 2680(c) on the grounds that alternative means existed 
for ''recovering back any tax that has been paid but was not properly 
owing." 64 Section 2680(c) immunizes the government from liability for 
its acts arising out of the detention of goods and tax collection. 65 Just 
as procedures already existed for recovering wrongly paid taxes, the 
judicial forfeiture proceeding offered a means for recovering wrongly 
seized property.66 Thus, in adopting section 2680(c), Congress intended 
to bar only those claims aimed at recovering seized property - con-
version claims. 
58. See 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 17, § 72. Claims which fall within the FTCA and are com-
pensable under another statute are not put to an election of remedies or subject to a doctrine 
of exclusiveness. Recovery is available under either statute. 
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1976). 
60. Tort Claims Hearings, supra note 45, at 38 (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff), 
cited in Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1980) (per curiarn). 
61. See supra notes 26 & 28 and accompanying text. 
62. Because the FTCA remedy only allows suits to recover money damages, claimants using 
the Act to recover on a conversion claim cannot force the government to return the property. 
28 u.s.c. § 1346(b) (1976). 
63. See, e.g., Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Div. of Treasury Dep't of United 
States, 530 F .2d 672, 675, 677 (5th Cir. 1976). For a description of the judicial forfeiture process 
and the relevant issues therein, see supra note 29. 
64. See supra note 60. 
65. See supra note 12. 
66. See Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Div. of Treasury Dep't of United States, 
530 F.2d 672, 674-75, 677 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing In re Behrens, 39 F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 1930); 
Slocum v. Mayberry, IS U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 9 (1817)). 
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2. Property damage claims- Unlike conversion claims, no adequate 
alternative remedy exists for detention-related property damage claims. 
The judicial forfeiture proceeding, which provides the alternative remedy 
for conversion claims, cannot remedy property damage claims. In such 
an in rem proceeding, a court can only return the property to the owner. 67 
It cannot award recovery for property damage occurring during 
detention. 68 
No other available alternative remedy can compensate for detention-
related property damage. Claimants could conceivably recover for prop-
erty damage inflicted by the government under two separate provisions 
of the Tucker Act69 or in a suit against individual customs officers. 
Still, none of these possibilities offer an adequate remedy, because 
recovery is either limited to specific fact situations or is unlikely in 
any circumstance. Also, no evidence indicates that Congress intended 
these remedies to preclude an FTCA remedy. 
a. Suit under the Tucker Act- One provision of the Tucker Act 
allows the government to be sued on contract claims. 10 In Alliance 
Assurance Co. v. United States, 11 a detention-related property damage 
claim was brought against the government under a Tucker Act implied 
contract of bailment. The court, in allowing the claim, held that the 
government impliedly contracted to act as a bailee when it seized prop-
erty, thereby undertaking a duty to treat the property with reasonable 
care. 72 Such a theory may justify a remedy in situations where a customs 
official merely stages a routine inspection of property and negligently 
damages it. 73 For the great majority of cases, however, the theory can-
67. The sole object of the forfeiture proceeding is to determine whether the seizure was rightful. 
Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 318 (1818); 36 AM. JUR. 2D, Forfeitures and Penalties 
§ 47 (1968). If the seizure was wrongful, the property is to be returned to the owner. Gelston 
v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 315. An in rem proceeding is a proceeding to determine the 
right in specific property. 2.ellen v. Second New Haven Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (D. 
Conn. 1978); Robertson v. Department of Defense, 402 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 (D.D.C. 1975). 
Accordingly, the court can only order the property's disposition. Awarding the owner damages 
for losses sustained during the seizure would involve questions of the rights and powers of in-
dividuals and branches of government, hence it would become an in personam inquiry, see Shuford 
v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 755, 759 (10th Cir. 1965), over which in rem jurisdiction does not apply. 
68. Even if the claimant might theoretically be able to assert counterclaims for property damage 
at the judicial forfeiture proceeding, the claimant will seldom know of such damage or its extent 
at the time of this proceeding because the government still holds the property. 
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976). The Tucker Act allows recovery against the United States 
for claims based on the application of a law of Congress that causes harm to the claimant, 
and for contractual recoveries against the government. 
10. Id. 
71. 252 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958). 
72. Id. at 532-33. 
13. Id. (holding that the actions of the parties exhibited the presence of an implied-in-fact 
contract remediable under the Tucker Act). But see Wall & Childres, The Law of Restitution 
and the Federal Government, 66 Nw. L. REv. 587, 617-18 (1971) (criticizing the Affiance court 
for finding an implied-in-fact contract, when the actual intent of the parties indicated that there 
was only an implied-in-law contract). 
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not justify a remedy, because the government usually seizes property 
outright under a claim of rightful ownership. 74 Thus, under these cir-
cumstances, a court could not· reasonably imply a contract to care for 
another's property.75 
The Tucker Act might conceivably provide another basis for prop-
erty damage recovery. In addition to providing a remedy against the 
government for contract claims, the Tucker Act also imposes govern-
ment liability for unconstitutional application of a law. 76 If a claimant 
can prove the unlawful nature of the seizure at the judicial forfeiture 
proceeding, 11 he has the right to have the property returned. The claim-
ant also can then recover under the Tucker Act any depreciation the 
property underwent during detention. 78 Otherwise, the loss in value 
represents an unlawful penalty assessed through an unconstitutional 
seizure. 79 Although no case has held that a claimant can recover for 
detention-related property damage rather than depreciation under this 
theory, the extension seems logical. Unfortunately, the claimant can 
only employ such a Tucker Act recovery after prevailing at the judicial 
forfeiture proceeding; the Act would not help a claimant who merely 
received the property in damaged condition when the Customs Service 
decided to forego the property's forfeiture. 80 
Both types of Tucker Act recoveries for property detentions therefore 
provide inadequate remedies, because they are limited to specific fact 
situations and may not be applicable to detention property damage. 
In addition, the Tucker Act is not the sort of remedy Congress in-
tended to preclude an FTCA remedy. Indeed, the FTCA's remedies 
generally complement the Tucker Act's remedies. 81 
74. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 467 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890); Provimi, Inc. v. United States, 680 
F.2d 111, 113 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Walker v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 251, 258-59 (D. Ga. 1977). 
15. See, e.g., Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460,467 (1980) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting); Walker v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 251, 258-59 (D. Ga. 1977). 
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976). 
77. For a discussion of the issues raised in judicial forfeiture proceedings, see supra note 29. 
78. United States v. One 1965 Chevrolet Impala Convertible, 475 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1973). 
79. Id. at 886 (citing United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971)). 
80. For example, Kosak v. United States involved such a fact situation. Kosak was arrested 
for suspected smuggling operations, and the Customs Service seized his collection of art and 
antiques. He was later acquitted of the criminal charges, and the Customs Service agreed to return 
the property. The property, however, was returned in damaged condition, amounting to over 
$12,000 in damages. Kosak could not take advantage of the Tucker Act's provisions because no 
judicial forfeiture proceeding had occurred to determine whether the Customs Service had acted 
unconstitutionally. 
81. See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 462-63 (1980) (per curiam). 
The Court stated that § 2680(c) "does not limit or otherwise affect immunity waivers contained 
in other statutes such as the Tucker Act," and "it appears that in exempting from the Tort 
Claims Act those claims described in § 2680(c), Congress did not further intend to disturb other 
· existing statutory remedies." 
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b. Suit against a customs official individually- If a suit against the 
federal government has been barred, the claimant may have an alter-
native remedy against the individual officer responsible for the 
negligence. 82 For example, claimants have prevailed in actions against 
district directors83 of the Customs Service for delays in instituting judicial 
forfeiture proceedings. 84 No suit has ever been brought against an in-
dividual Customs official for detention-related property damage possibly 
because a claimant would not know which officer actually lost or 
damaged the property. as Unlike the delay cases, in which a statutory 
mandate requires Customs Service district directors to use reasonable 
speed in instituting the property forfeiture, 86 no Customs official has 
a statutory responsibility to ensure the secure storage of property. 87 
A claim against district directors would not be likely to succeed. A 
remedy sought against an official at any higher level would be deemed· 
a suit against the federal government, 88 and section 2680(c) of the FfCA 
would bar such a remedy. Moreover, a suit against an individual official. 
would produce a much greater chilling effect on government opera-
tion than would holding the government itself liable. 89 
The "adequate alternative remedy" theory thus fails to justify de-
82. With a few notable exceptions, the FTCA's granting of a remedy against the government 
does not preclude a suit against the responsible government officer individually. These excep-
tions are for cases involving a government employee driver involved in a traffic accident, for 
cases involving malpractice claims, and for cases involving swine flu immunization. See 1 L. 
JAYSON, supra note 17, §§ 175.03-.04 · 
83. The United States Custom Service has divided the country into seven regions and further 
subdivided the regions into a total of 45 districts. CuSTOMS USA, supra note 2, at 5. The disttict 
director is the senior Customs official in each district. Id. at 19. 
84. See, e.g., States Marine Lines Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974); cf. Seguin 
v. Eide, 645 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 2446 (1983). Seguin v. Eide was vacated 
in light of United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in United 
States Currency, 103 S. Ct. 2005 (1983), which held that a fifteen month delay in instituting 
the forfeiture was not unreasonable. Seguin held that a four-and-a-half month administrative 
delay was unreasonable and held the district director liable for damages. District directors could 
be held liable for delays in the forfeiture process, but the delay would have to be a significant one. 
85. Even the Customs Service itself might not know who individually caused the property 
damage or miSPlacement. See, e.g., Alliance Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529, 531 
(2d Cir. 1958) ("the manner in which they [the seized goods) have vanished remains a mystery") 
(quoting Allied Assurance Co. v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 118, 123 (1956). Therefore, the 
chance of the original owner knowing what h11ppened during storage is even more remote. 
86. See supra note 84. In both Schultz and Seguin, a statutory directive gave the district 
director of Customs reSPonsibility for proceeding with the forfeiture without delay. 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1602-1604 (1976). 
87. In fact, none of the Customs Service statutes or regulations require the property to be 
securely stored at all. 19 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976), which comes the closest to imposing a duty 
on the Customs Service, requires only that customs officials shall store the property in a place 
which is convenient and at an appropriate cost. 
88. See, e.g., Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms Div. of Treasury Dep't of United 
States, 530 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 1976). 
89. See, e.g., Berman, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 11 CouJM. L. 
REY. 1175, 1187 (1977); Ogden, supra note 41, at 921, 941. 
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nying an FTCA remedy to detention-related property damage claims. 
These property damage claims are not remediable at the forfeiture pro-
ceeding, and no other remedies off er adequate compensation. Hence, 
the majority interpretation of section 2680(c) has changed a congres-
sional attempt to avoid duplicate remedies for detention claims into 
a mechanism for completely denying detention-related property damage 
claims. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The FI'CA's policy considerations distinguish between property 
damage claims and conversion claims. The policy considerations under-
lying the FTCA's exceptions reveal two intentions: to avoid subjecting 
the federal government to the threat of liability and to protect certain 
existing adequate alternative remedies. The "impending liability" ra-
tionale does not justify barring either conversion or property damage 
detention claims. The "adequate alternative remedy" rationale justifies 
barring an FTCA remedy for conversion claims, but not for property 
damage claims. An adequate alternative remedy exists for conversion 
claims in the form of the judicial forfeiture proceeding. In contrast, 
property damage claims are not remediable at the forfeiture proceeding, 
and no other remedy is adequate for these claims. Hence, when Con-
gress enacted section 2680(c) of the FTCA, barring all claims arising 
out of the detention of goods, it intended to bar only conversion claims. 
Other claims, such as property damage claims, should be remediable 
under the FTCA, because a contrary holding would produce the 
unintended effect of leaving most detention-related property damage 
claimants without any judicial remedy. 
-Richard F. Neidhardt 

